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• 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
OCTOBER TERM, 1967. 
No. 67. 
JOHN W. TERRY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF AMERICANS FOR EFFECTIVE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, AS AMICUS CURIAE. 
Interest of the Amicus Curiae . 
. A:mericans for Effective Law Enforcement is a non-
partisan, non-political, not-for-profit organization, incor-
porated under the laws of the State of Illinois in 1966. It 
has also been declared a tax-exempt, educational corporation 
by the United States Treasury Department. 
Although generally concerned with the problems of crime 
and the effective administration of criminal justice in 
America, a specific objective of AELE is participation 
in significant cases, in this and other courts, which will, by. 
their holdings, profoundly affect not only the rights of in-
dividual defendants confronted by the processes of the law, 
but also the right of all our citizens to ''secure for them-
selves the domestic tranquility and justice that has been 
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guaranteed in the Preamble to The Constitution of the 
United States.' 71 
Like another amicus in this case,2 AELE is concerned 
about persons beyond the litigants, and about issues beyond 
those immediately raised by the litigants' briefs. 
Without derogating the concern of another amicus for 
the innocent citizens who are subjected to :field interroga-
tions-and especially those who have been the victims of 
abusive field interrogations--it needs to be made clear that 
there are other Americans, by far the majority, who have 
an interest in seeing that reasonable, non-abusive police 
procedures which prevent crime and catch criminals are 
sustained by the courts. 
AELE 's deep rooted interest on behalf of the citizenry 
at large is embodied in recent statements appearing in 
the President's Crime Commission Report: 
''There is much crime in America, more than ever is 
reported, far more than ever is solved, far too much 
for the health of the nation. Every American knows 
that. Every American is, ·in a sense, a victim of crime. 
Violence and theft have not only injured, often irre-
parably, hundreds of thousands of citizens, but have 
directly affected everyone.'' 
'' ... the fear of crimes of violence is not a simple 
fear of injury, or death or even of all crimes of vio-
lence, but, at bottom, a fear of strangers. • • • This fear 
of strangers has greatly impoverished the lives of 
many Americans, especially those who live in high-
crime neighborhoods in large cities. People stay behind 
the locked doors of their homes rather than risk walk-
ing in the streets at night. Poor people spend money on 
taxis because they are afraid to walk or use public 
transportation. Sociable people are afraid to talk to 
those they do not know. In short, society is to an in-
1. Preamble to the By-Laws of .Americans For Effective Law 
Enforcement, Inc., 2. 
2. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
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creasing extent suffering from what economists call 
'opportunity costs' as the result of fear of crime. • • • 
'Vhen many persons stay home, they are not availing 
themselves of the opportunities offered in their com-
munities, and they are not visiting their friends as fre-
quently as they might. The general level of social 
interaction in the society is reduced. 
When fear of crime becomes fear of the stranger the 
social order is further damaged. As the level of social-
ability and mutual trust is reduced, streets and public 
places can indeed become more dangerous. Not only 
will there be fewer people abroad but those who are 
abroad will manifest a fear of and a lack of concern 
for each other. The reported incidents of bystanders 
indifferent to cries for help are the logical consequence 
of a reduced sociability, mutual distrust and with-
drawal. 
However, the most dangerous aspect of a fear of 
strangers is its implication that the moral and social 
order of society are of doubtful trustworthiness and 
stability. Everyone is dependent on this order to in-
still in all members of society a respect for the persons 
and possessions of others. When it appears that there 
are more and more people who do not have this respect, 
the security that comes from living in an orderly and 
tn1stworthy society is undermined. The tendency of 
many people to think of crime in terms of increasing 
moral deterioration is an indication that they are 
losing their faith in their society. And so the costs of the 
fear of crime to the social order may ultimately be even 
greater than its psychological costs to individuals." 3 
We have set forth these apprehensions of the American 
people at length because we believe they vitally relate to 
the questions involved in this case. We believe that if field 
interrogation, or "stop and frisk" as it is most commonly 
(and sometimes most inappropriately) called is found to be 
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT A.ND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1, 52 (hereinafter cited as CoHHISSION 
REPORT). 
4 
at odds with the Constitution, the ability of the police to pre-
vent crime and catch criminals will be sharply constrained. 
And the consequent physical and social impoverishment of 
our people will, tragically, increase.• 
Apart from the desire of AELE to give voice to the 
American public concerned about crime and its con-
sequences, we believe that it is important to also express 
what we think are the views of the law enforcement profes-
sion as a whole, unrestricted by the needs or desires to 
uphold a particular decision or to sustain a particular 
arrest or search. This position can be assumed by an 
amicus whereas it may not be available to a litigant. The 
importance of our stating these views is obvious in the light 
of the following considerations: 
" ... many ... decisions [are] made without the 
needs of law enforcement, and the police policies that 
are designed to meet those needs, being effectively pre-
sented to the court. If judges are to balance accurately 
law enforcement needs against human rights, the former 
must be articulated. They seldom are. Few legisla-
tures and police administrators have defined in detail 
how and under what conditions certain police practices 
are to be used. As a result, the courts often must rely 
exclusively on intuition and common sense in judging 
what kinds of police action are reasonable or neces-
sary, even though their decisions about the actions of 
one police officer can restrict police activity in the 
entire nation.'' 5 
4. "In society's day-to-day efforts to protect its citizens from 
the suffering, fear, and property loss produced by crime and the 
threat of crime, the policeman occupies the front line. It is he who 
directly confronts criminal situations, and it is to him that the 
public looks for personal safety. The freedom of Americans to 
walk their streets and be secure in their homes---in fact, to do what 
they want when they want-depends to a great extent on their 
policemen.'' COMMISSION REPORT 92. 
5. COMMISSION REPORT 94. 
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Finally, we ask that the arguments which follow be judged 
in the light of the stated policy of AELE to support equal 
justice and equal treatment for all.' 
The consents of the parties to our appearance as amicus 
in this case have been filed with the Clerk of this Court. 
6. ''In pursuing its objectives, AELE will adhere to the funda-
mental principles of justice and equal protection for all irrespective 
of color, creed, religion, social status or other individual or group 
characteristics. It emphatically rejects the support of, and will not 
support any individual, group, or activity that advocates racial 
bias or other unconstitutional concepts.'' By-Laws of Americans 
for Effective Law Enforcement 2. 
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ARGUMENT. 
"To question all things .. . 
above all, to insist upon, having 
the meaning of a word clearly 
understood before using it, and 
the meaning of a proposition 
before assenting to it. . . . " 7 
I. 
WHAT STOP AND FRISK IS-AND WHAT IT IS NOT. 
The law enforcement process which we ask this Court to 
sustain in the ''stop and frisk'' cases under consideration 
is simply this: A police officer may detain pedestrians or 
motorists in public places, and question them as to their 
identity and purpose in the particular location, when under 
the circumstances, such detention and questioning seems 
appropriate to a prudent police officer-one mindful of his 
responsibility "to prevent crime and catch criminals " 8-
because reasonable suspicion of criminality has been 
aroused, although there is not yet probable cause to believe 
that a crime has been, or is being, committed. Whether 
such police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is the 
core of these cases. We believe that it does not. 
All other issues in the cases are subsidiary. One, how-
ever, should be mentioned at this point, and it is of con-
siderable importance: If the above described police con-
duct is c0nstitutional, as we believe it is, the officer involved 
7. From the inaugural address of John Stuart Mill as Rector, 
University of St. Andrews, February 1, 1867. 
8. The phrase of Mr. Justice Schaefer for the Supreme Court 
of Illinois in People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 19, 166 N. E. 2d 433, 
437 (1960). 
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must have the power to act reasonably to protect himself 
from attack, or to prevent the suspect 's escape, during 
the course of the detention and inquiry. Whether such 
power implicates only a "frisk", or authorizes a "search", 
is a question to which we shall return later. 
One of the problems, of course, in pursuing a rational 
discussion of field interrogation is to be rid of the tyranny 
of labels to which the discussion about "stop and frisk" 
has been subjected in recent years by lawyers as well as 
laymen. Whether the process is known as ''stop and 
frisk", "stop and question", "street stop", or "field in-
terrogation", is not only unimportant, but misleading 
as well. 
The power which we ask this Court to sustain will not 
receive appropriate analysis if the analysis proceeds upon 
the assumption, usually colored by emotional reaction to 
the phrase, that "stop" means an arbitrary selection 
of subjects and that "frisk" automatically follows a stop. 
On the other hand, we make no claim that arbitrary police 
action is any the less so because concealed behind the more 
neutral sounding facade of "field interrogation". We 
cannot, at this juncture, afford to get ''hung up'' on 
the name. 
For this confusion law enforcement must share at least 
part, or perhaps most, of the blame. Traditionally, the 
term ''field interrogation,'' has been used to describe a 
mixed bag of police techniques in aid of the patrol process, 
some of which are constitutional and some not. 
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''A field interrogation is, in some circumstances, 
difficult to distinguish from an arrest and subsequent 
street questioning before the arrested person is taken 
to the station. In other circumstances, a field interroga-
tion may be difficult to distinguish from crime-preven-
tive street practices which have an objective other than 
arrest and prosecution of suspects. This is true, for 
8 
example, with respect to a street confrontation pro-
gram designed to discover and confiscate knives, guns, 
and other weapons. Despite the difficulty in some 
situations of clearly distinguishing field interrogation 
from arrest, on the one hand, or from police on-the-
street preventive practices, on the other, observation 
of current police practice does disclose that field inter-
rogation is an isolable police practice which has inde-
pendent operational significance.' ' 9 
vVe also believe that the kind of field interrogation de-
scribed in our definition is an isolable police practice that 
can be sustained as constitutional. vVhatever value the 
police attach to concomitant aspects of patrol as crime 
repression measures, however, cannot obscure the fact that 
their use is subject to serious constitutional question. 
What is important is the necessity, for present purposes, 
that the impermissible patrol practices be clearly identiiied 
and put to one side. 
A current commentary on police patrol practices identi-
fies at least three other techniques which may, in some 
instances, resemble the police field interrogation power 
for which we contend. These are: (1) the practice of 
regularly, and without particular cause, interrogating·, 
searching, and sometimes arresting, known vice offenders ;10 
( 2) the practice of routine searches of males, particularly 
young males, in high crime areas, to discover and con-
:fisca te weapons ;11 and (3) the searching and dispersal from 
the streets of congregating members of teen-age gangs.12 
All of these techniques, stated abstractedly, may be, and 
probably are, violative of the Fourth Amendment. We 
would not ask this Court to a pp rove them, efficacious as they 
9. TIFFANY, McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 9 
(1967) (hereinafter cited as DETECTION) (Emphasis added.) 
10. DETECTION 11-12. 
11. DETECTION 13. 
12. DETECTION 13-14. 
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9 
may be as crime prevention measures. The point we make 
is that they can be distinguished, and must he distinguished, 
from the practice of stopping particular persons, found in 
particular circumstances which indicate past, occurring, or 
potential criminal conduct, for the purpose of questioning 
-in some cases, followed, or even preceded, by the pro-
tective device of frisk or search for weapons. We reject 
absolutely the position of the other a1nicus,13 and some of 
the commentators,14 that this Court must also sustain these 
practices if our position be adopted. 
The kind of constitutional field interrogation which can 
be isolated from other practices is illustrated by two cases: 
Terry v. Ohio, in which we appear as amicus, and State v. 
Duley, 40 N. J. 460, 231 A. 2d 353 (1967), a recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
In Terry, a detective with thirty-nine years of experience 
observed two men on a street corner in downtown Cleve-
land. For a period of ten to twelve minutes, he watched 
them as first one, then the_ other, repeatedly walked down 
the street, peered into the windo'v of a jewelry store or an 
airline office, and then returned to converse. Shortly they 
were joined by a third man. A conversation ensued and the 
third man then departed. Thereafter, the original two 
walked several hundred feet down the street and again 
engaged in conversation with the third man. At this point, 
the detective, whose suspicions had been thus aroused, ap-
proached the three men, identified himself as a police officer 
and asked for their names. \\"hen he received only a 
mumbled reply, he turned one man around and patted down 
the outside of his clothing. This frisk revealed a hard 
13. Cf. Brief for the NAACP as Amicus Curiae 45. 
14. Schwartz, Stop And Frisk: A Case Study in JudicUil Con-
trol of the Police, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 433, 443-44 (1967). But 
see Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J . 
CRIM. L., C. & P . S. 465, 469 (1967); Younger, Stop and Frisk: 
"Say It Like It Is", 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 293, 295 (1967). 
10 
object which, upon seizure, turned out to be a revolver .. 
All three men were then ordered into a store and told to 
face the wall. A frisk of the second man disclosed another 
revolver. A frisk of the third man disclosed nothing. 
The record is clear in Terry concerning the purposes for 
which the original stop and subsequent frisk were made. 
The officer testified that he approached the defendants to 
question them because "he suspected them of casing a job, 
a stick.up''. When he received only a mumbled reply, he 
frisked them because ''I felt as though they were going to 
pull a stick·up and they may have a gun ".15 In this case, 
therefore, there is no question about the motives of the 
officer. He was not engaged in an arbitrary or random 
stopping of persons on the street. He was not engaged in 
suppression of vice activities by the seizures of known vice 
offenders. He was not concerned with ''getting the 
weapons off the street'' of an urban ghetto. He was not 
seeking to establish his authority over the ''turf'' sought 
to be ruled by teen.age gang members. He was not seeking 
to ferret out contraband. He was investigating particular 
persons found in particular circumstances which indicated 
to him, as a reasonable and experienced police officer, 
that a crime might be about to occur, and he was doing it 
in a manner entirely, and purposefully, concerned with his 
own safety. 
It may be argued that the conduct deemed suspicious by 
the officer in Terry could just as well have been innocent. 
The men could have been waiting for someone on the street 
corner. Another companion could have been making a 
purchase in the jewelry store and a display in the window 
of the airline office could have caught the eye of his friends 
waiting outside. The conversation with the third man 
might have been on some subject irrelevant to their im· 
15. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N. E. 2d 114, 120 
(Ct. App. 1966) . 
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mediate purpose. But even in cases involving probable 
cause for arrest, it has never been held that the conduct of 
the defendants under examination must be entirely con-
sistent with guilt and utterly inconsistent with innocence. 
Such a holding, indeed, would destroy the concept of prob-
able cause as a viable standard. 
An even stronger case is presented by Dilley. Here a 
veteran member of the New Brunswick police department 
was patrolling a high crime area in a police car at 3 :00 
A. M:. ''He knew the a·rea very well, having been born and 
brought up there, and he described it in detail. He had 
worked in the area as a police officer for fifteen years, knew 
the people there and both Dilley and Brinkley [a co-defend-
ant] were strangers to him." As. the two men were walking 
down the street, ''they kept turning their heads every few 
steps 109king to the rear''. ''He drove on, making a series 
of turns, until he observed the men standing between two 
automobiles in a municipal parking lot. As he pulled into 
the lot, the men turned and walked back to the street. He 
followed and called to them to stop. He got out of his 
car, asked them what they were doing there and they re-
plied 'nothing'. He told them they were under arrest and 
he gave the defendant Dilley 'a quick frisk' by patting 
him on the right side of his ski jacket. He felt a gun in 
Dilley's pocket and removed it. It was a loaded .38 caliber 
revolver. The other man ... was also found to be 
armed. " 16 
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Reasonable men might well differ on whether the officer 
had probable cause for arrest when he stopped the men 
and frisked them, and, in fact, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey declined to so hold. But reasonable men can-
not differ, we believe, on whether there was, at that time, 
a n~asonable suspicion of criminality which justified the 
officer in detaining the men for the purposes of furlher in-
16. State v. Dilley, 40 N. J. 460, 231 A. 2d 353, 354 (1967). 
12 
quiry. It is also important to note that the officer did not 
stop the men simply because they were walking down the 
street of a high-crime, low-income neighborhood at 3 :00 
A. M. and were unknown to him, nor did he stop them 
because they were standing between two parked cars. He 
stopped them only after they walked away from the lot as 
he pulled in~ and he frisked them only after they gave an 
answer to his question which ascribed no reasonable pur-
pose to their conduct. 
In sanctioning what the officer did in Dilley, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey did not, therefore, subject persons 
roaming the streets of the ghetto late at night to random 
or arbitrary stops and searches simply because of such 
behavior. People are entitled, we suppose, to walk the 
streets of a city at 3 :00 A. ~L with no purpose in mind. This 
right, however, does not immunize them from reasonable 
police inquiry when such conduct, considered in light of 
other circumstances, renders it reasonable for the police 
to inquire into possible criminality. The fact that innocent 
men may also walk the streets late at night does not im-
munize all who do so under all circumstances. 
Here again, as was the case with Terry, no improper 
motive for the frisk can be imputed, on this record, to the 
officer. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey found, 
"When he frisked Dilley he did it for self-protection. He 
described his action as 'common police procedure' in ac-
cordance with formal instructions he had received in both 
federal and state police schools. He stressed that he was 
alone when he confronted the two men, that he did not 
know 'what they were carrying' and that it was 'very well 
possible' he could have been 'killed by one of them.' ''11 
"\Ve repeat that the police conduct involved in Terry and 
Dilley is the kind of conduct which can rightly be called 
17. 231 A. 2d at 354. 
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proper field interrogation. It may be separated, in the 
minds of the police and in the opinions of the courts, from 
related, but clearly distinguishable, field procedures which 
have as their purpose the suppression of vice, the confis-
cation of weapons, or the establishment of police "author-
ity'' over the streets in high-crime areas. More import-
antly, it may be sustained as constitutional without licens-
ing either its abuse or the other practices of repression. 
It cannot be denied that stopping persons on the street 
for questioning which involves detention against the will 
and, in some cases, a concurrent or subsequent frisk or 
search, is conduct subject to the commands of the Fourth 
Amendment. If the standard by which such conduct is to 
be judged, tberef ore, is the same standard of probable 
cause traditionally required for arrest, we concede that 
such conduct is, under the prior opinions of this Court, 
unconstitutional. But we believe that such an inflexible 
application of traditional probable cause to this conduct 
would be at odds with the whole spirit of the Fourth 
Amendment; that there may be a concept of variable 
probable cause which applies to pre-arrest investigatory 
procedures such as field interrogation, and that the true 
test is the balancing of the degree of interference with per-
sonal liberty against the information possessed by the 
officer which impelled him to act. This argument, and 
others, can best be made in response to specific issues 
raised by the brief for the NAACP Legal Defense And 
Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae, and we turn, 
the ref ore, to a consideration of some of their arguments. 
514 
14 
II. 
THE PosmoN OF THE OPPONENTS OF STOP AND FRISK. 
(1) "The evidence is weighty and uncontradicted that 
stop and frisk power is employed by the police most fre-
quently against the inhabitants of om· inner cities, racial 
minorities and the underprivileged. " 18 
We are somewhat at a loss to appreciate the force of this 
argument in the Brief of the NAACP. It could as well be 
said that the arrest power is employed by the police most 
frequently against the inhabitants of our inner cities, racial 
minorities, and the underprivileged. Are the arrest statutes 
to be struck down on this account f Those who deal inti-
mately with the day-to-day process of criminal justice in 
this country can testify that the entire machinery of the 
criminal law ensnares the poor more often than the wealthy, 
and this will continue to be true so long as poverty, lack of 
education, and lack of employment opportunities persist as 
causative crime factors. In many cities, minority group 
defendants compose a disproportionate share of the cases 
on the dockets of our criminal courts. Are they therefore 
immune from prosecution, conviction and punishment T May 
only the afiluent, suburbanite members of a racial majority 
group be called to account for their crimes 1 
Perhaps the amicus means more than this. Perhaps the 
implication is that the stop and frisk power is wrongfully, 
and by evil design, employed by the police most frequently 
against the inhabitant s of our inner cities, racial minorities, 
and the underprivileged.19 If that is the argument, AELE 
rejects the claim that the evidence is "weighty and un-
contradicted' '. 
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
18. Brief for the NAACP 3. 
19. See Brief for the NAACP 45, n. 79. 
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Administration of Justice . had this to say with respect to 
the behavior of the police toward minority groups: 
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''Commission observers watched policemen work in 
minority-group neighborhoods in a number of major 
cities, and the commission has studied the findings of 
those who have made observations in many other cities. 
These observations indicate that any generalization 
about how 'policemen' treat 'minority-group members', 
or vice versa, is almost sure to be misleading. For 
example, one commission study conducted in a few 
cities showed that most policemen treat minority-group 
citizens in a nondiscriminatory manner, and received at 
least as much cooperation and courtesy from Negroes 
as from whites. " 20 
Following are statements that appear in the reports sub-
mitted to the Commission: 
''All citizens were asked about their views whether 
the police should have the right to stop them and ques-
tion or search them. A substantial majority of the 
citizens believe that the police should at least under 
some conditions be able to stop and ask them their 
names and addresses (79 percent); an absolute ma-
jority of 56 per cent sets no conditions for stopping 
and asking them to identify themselves. In Boston 
there are no differences between Negroes and whites 
with almost 6 of 10 citizens saying they would not 
object to the police asking them to stop and identify 
themselves by name and address under any condi-
tions.' '21 • • • 
"Assuming that police discretion is greater in the 
on-view encounter, it could also be assumed that officers 
will exercise that discretion more often with Negroes 
than whites (whether on grounds of a higher crime 
rate for Negroes than whites in these cities or on 
20. COMMISSION REPORT 99-100. 
21. 1 STUDIE.S IN CRIME AND LA w ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR 
METROPOLITAN AREAS (Field Surveys III) 87 (Report of a Research 
Study Submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice, 1967). 
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grounds of discrimination, or some other basis). Cor-
relatively, aggravated assaults and other kinds of 
violence are more commonly observed for Negroes than 
whites in dispatched encounters in these cities so that 
the officer more likely would need to search :N" egroes 
than whites for his own protection in dispatched en-
counters. • • • Personal searches conducted on Negroes 
are over twice as productive of weapons as are those 
conducted on whites. 
"In on-view situations one-in-five frisks of a Negro 
yielded a gun; for whites the proportion was one-in-
ten. • • •In both types of mobilization [dispa.tched and 
on-view] the police more frequently conduct personal 
searches on Negroes than on whites; Negroes object 
less often, but they are more likely to be carrying 
weapons fhan whites. • • • It is problematic whether 
police officers cognitively as well as behaviorally search 
those citizens upon whom their searches are most likely 
to be successful. The observations do not allow for 
inferences about police motivations. This 'attempt-
success ratio' is clear as a behavioral phenomenon, 
nevertheless.' '22 
In any event, if the police more often exercise the power 
of stop and frisk against inner city residents, the poor, and 
the minority groups because a.ll the forces of the criminal 
process operate more often against such persons, it follo\vs 
that when the police wrongfully use such power-whether 
by design or mistake-they will do so against the same 
people. \Vhat does not follow, however, is the conclusion 
that the proper exercise of such power should therefore be 
declared unconstitutional. 
(2) " .. . the Court is now asked for the first time to 
legitimate criminal investigative activity that significantly 
intrudes ·upon the privacy of individuals who are undif-
22. 2 STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, 85-88 Sltpra 
n. 21 (Emphasis in original. ) 
23. Brief for the NAACP 10-11. 
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f erentiable f1·om Everyman as the probable perpetrators 
of a crinie. ''23 
Other persons were walking the streets of Cleveland at 
the time of the encounter which led to the stop, frisk and 
arrest in the Terry case; they were not stopped, frisked, 
and arrested. The record in this case makes plain that 
there was conduct which reasonably differentiated Terry 
from ''Everyman''. The record in the Dilley case makes 
plain that there was conduct which reasonably differen-
tiated Dilley and his companion from ''Everyman''. 
The NAACP argument does not hold unless it is directed 
to the m·bitrary conduct of police or to field investigative 
procedures which are aimed at weapons confiscation and 
are the ref ore directed against a large enough class to in-
clude, at least at that time and in that place, "Everyman". 
The answer is that we are not asking this Court to "legiti-
mate" such "criminal investigative activity". \Ve have 
already said that such conduct is unconstitutional. 
( 3) "However -intellectually reasonable Dean Barrett's 
bala.ncing approach may be in the corridors of academe, it 
is a delusive an,d unworkable proposition on the streets of 
ou.r cities, and particularly on the streets of our ghettos 
where stop-frisk logic does its daily work. Closely inspected, 
we believe, both the 'balancing' theory of Fourth .Amend-
ment 1rights mul the Stop-Frisk llf odel that is built upo1.,, it 
show themselves to be m.ere fine, scholastic pretexts for 
oppression. The 'minor interfe·rence with personal liberty' 
that they sanction is a 1najor interference; the protections 
which they promise are unreal illusions; the 'balance' scale 
which they pitrport to employ is invariably tipped by the 
police conimissioner' s thumb; and their consequence is 
nothing more or less than a police dictatorship of the 
streets. " 2• 
24. Brief for the NAACP 34. 
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There are several things wrong with this argument. 
First, the ai;gument assumes that only those who have 
spent half their lives in squad cars, or perhaps all of their 
lives on the streets of the ghetto, are qualified to speak on 
the proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Dean 
Barrett is obviously not. Confined as he is to ''the corridors 
of academe", spinning out theories both "delusive and un-
workable", it is not surprising that his arguments are 
viewed by some as only ''fine scholastic pretexts for oppres-
sion'' whose ''consequence is nothing more or less than a 
police dictatorship of the streets". 
If this attack were confined simply to Dean Barrett, per-
haps one of the country's foremost commentators on the 
criminal .law in general, and the Fourth Amendment in 
particular, it could be discounted, questions of taste aside. 
Alas, however, this Court also appears to have been taken 
in by Dean Barrett. For in the same article26 in which he 
suggested the balancing approach to the question of 
Fourth Amendment applicat~on to pre-arrest investigatory 
procedures, Dean Barrett severely criticized both the 
rationales and consequences of this Court's holding in 
Frank v. Maryland, a case that has lately been overruled,20 
and precisely upon the grounds urged by him. But perhaps 
the "corridors of academe" are merely one-way streets. 
Second, Dean Barrett's argument, which the NAACP 
characterizes as the ''most articulate expression'' of the 
balancing rationale, is not fully treated in the amicus brief. 
It deserves further explication here. Dean Barrett first 
set forth the kinds of police conduct under scrutiny: 
"Investigation is the process by which police are able 
to acquire that 'probable cause' which will justify the 
arrest and prosecution of a suspected offender. • • • 
25. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, And The Fourth 
Amendment. SUP. CT. REv. 46, 72-74 (1960). 
26. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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The process of investigation necessarily involves 
varying degrees of inter/ erence with the privacy of 
suspected offenders. 'Stakeouts' with the police watch-
ing a man's house, the tailing of suspects, the use of 
undercover agents, and similar investigative tech-
niques result, obviously, in invasions of privacy which 
are offensive to the person involved. Stopping and 
questioning suspicious persons on the street involves 
a greater degree of restriction on personal liberty. 
• • • 
Yet if the general public interest in adequate law 
enforcement is to be served, it is clear that police 
must be given reasonably wide powers of investiga-
tion. Furthermore, if the goal is to protect individuals 
from the serious invasion of personal rights which re-
sults from formal a1·rests and charges of crime in the 
absence of clear showing of probable cause to believe 
that they have committed a crime, reasonable latitude 
must be given for investigative techniques of the kind 
just described. On the other hand, it is obvious that 
some restraint must be placed upon the police because 
indiscriminate use of these techniques could be unrea-
sonably oppressive.' m . 
He then described the difficulties encountered when 
on-street investigative conduct is held to be an interf er-
ence with liberty in the traditional sense of an ''arrest'' : 
520 
In applying the Fourth Amendment to the investi-
gative process the Court makes the issue turn upon 
traditional tort law concepts. • • • If he [the officer] 
restricts the liberty of movement of the suspect suffi-
ciently to commit the tort of false imprisonment, he 
can justify his action only by demonstrating that he 
had probable cause to make a formal arrest. • • • 
The result of this all-or-nothing approach is to 
place too little restraint on some investigative tech-
niques and too great restraint on others. It tends to 
defeat the fundamental objectives of the Fourth 
27. Barrett, supra n. 25 at 57-58 (Emphasis added.) 
.. 
,-
20 
Amendment by attempting to establish the same pro-
tection against relatively minor violations of person 
and privacy as against the most serious ones. The 
problems here can be illustrated by a consideration 
of . . . [Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 ( 1959) ] 
,,28 
Henry is the only case decided by this Court in which it 
may be said that the question of the propriety of a field 
interrogation on less. than probable cause was considered. 
The facts of the case are simple. The FBI, in the process 
of investigating the theft of an interstate shipment of 
whiskey were told by an official of the trucking company 
that the defendant Pierotti was somehow ''implicated'' with 
interstate shipments. Thereafter Pierotti and the defend-
ant Henry were seen leaving a tavern in the neighborhood 
where the theft occurred. They drove away together, and 
stopped in an alley in a residential neighborhood. Henry 
entered a residence and returned with cartons. The auto-
mobile then drove away and was lost by the surveilling 
agents. Sometime later the car was again seen near the 
tavern and the defendants' actions were repeated. As the 
car drove away from the residence a second time, loaded 
with more cartons, it was curbed by the agents. As Henry 
alighted from the car, he was heard to say to his companion 
"Hold it; it is the G's", and "Tell him you just picked 
me up". Looking into the car, the agents saw cartons 
with ''interstate'' labels. The defendant told the agents 
that the cartons were in the car when he and Pierotti had 
borrowed it, a statement the agents knew to be untrue. 
In Henry, the government conceded that an arrest took 
place when the defendants' freedom of movement was 
interrupted, that is, when the FBI signaled the car to the 
28. Id. at 58-59. 
521 
:I 
:1 
jl' .. 
.. 
. • I
j·~ 
. I 
~ I 
···~ 
-~ 
~I .. 
' 
522 
curb. Finding no probable cause for arrest at this point, 
a majority of this Court held the arrest to be unconstitu-
tional. 
Though the majority opinion in Henry simply holds that 
arrests cannot be made without probable cause, there is 
no explicit rejection of the proposition that investigative 
actions not amounting to arrest may be made on less than 
probable cause. Under these circumstances, it might well 
be argued that the government 's concession foreclosed the 
majority's consideration of this issue. The dissent in 
Henry explicitly said that the officers possessed sufficient 
information at the time of the stop to warrant further pre-
arrest investigation; that this investigation could take the 
form of a stop and detention for questioning; and that 
probable cause was not required for this action. . There-
after, the dissent argued, probable cause was found when 
the nature of the information received by the agents dur-
ing the stop was added to what they knew before the stop 
was made. Mr. Justice Clark said: 
''The oearlier events [prior to the stop] certainly dis-
closed ample grounds to justify the following of the 
car, the subsequent stoppitig thereof, and the question-
ing of petitioner by the agents." 29 
In our view, . therefore, the dissenting opinion in Henry 
is explicit authority for the proposition we advance in this 
case: that a police officer having reasonable suspicion of 
criminality may stop, detain, and question for the purpose 
of ascertaining whether probable cause may be found to 
support an arrest. 
The NAACP, as amicu.s, contends that the government's 
concession concerning the time of the arrest was not the 
controlling factor in Henry since the opinion of the major-
ity went on to say "That [the proposition that the arrest 
29. 361 U.S. at 106. 
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ity went on to say ''That [the proposition that the arrest 
29. 361 U.S. at 106. 
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took place at the stop] is our view on the facts of this 
particular case .. " 30 If, indeed, this Court held in Henry 
that an arrest requiring probable cause took place at the 
time the FBI stopped the car, then, of course, Henry is 
authority contrary to our position in this case. If that be 
so, we request that Henry now be reconsidered and over-
ruled. 
The view that Henry stands for the proposition that pre-
arrest :field detention cannot be made on less than probable 
cause is also hard to reconcile with the Court's subsequent 
disposition of Rios v. United States.31 There the govern-
ment specifically argued that "the policemen approached 
the standing taxi only for the purpose of routine interroga-
tion, and that they had no intent to detain the petitioner 
beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission''. 
This argument was not challenged by the Court's opinion; 
in fact the Court seemed to say that if the narcotics had 
been exposed during such a period ''a lawful arrest could 
then have been supported by their reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a felony was being committed in their presence".32 
The case was then remanded for factual :findings on when 
the arrest occurred. If Henry was decided, not upon the 
government's concession, but upon the Court's view of the 
facts, it follows that the Court would have held that the 
arrest in Rios took place when the police approached the 
taxi with the intention of detaining the defendant for the 
purposes of interrogation and there would have been no 
need for a remand. 
In any event, the authority of Henry as support for the 
argument that :field interrogation without probable cause 
violates the Fourth Amendment is persuasively diminished, 
we believe, by Dean Barrett's. conclusions, which we adopt: 
30. 361 U.S. at 103 (Emphasis added.) 
31. 364 u. s. 253 (1960). 
32. 364 U.S. at 262. 
523 
23 
''The question may be asked whether it is wise to re-
solve -problems of the type presented in Henry and 
Rios in terms of tort law concepts. • • • Would not the 
policy of the Fourth Amendment be better served by an 
approach which determines the reasonableness of each 
investigative technique by balancing the seriousness of 
the suspected crime and the degree of reasonable sus-
picion possessed by the police against the magnitude 
of the invasion of the personal security and property 
rights of the individual involved 1 
If one looks at the problem in these terms, it be-
comes rational to argue that in Henry the police did 
have sufficient grounds for suspicion to justify the rela-
tively minor interference with the personal liberty and 
property rights of Henry and Pierotti which was 
involved in stopping their car, questioning them, and 
looking through the open car door. In fact, did not 
the police act in a way which properly balanced the 
policies of the Fourth Amendment against the practical 
consequences to the suspected individuals T 'm 
We believe that the recent opinion of this Court in 
Camara v. 1.Iunicipal Court34· also supports the validity of 
the argument that governmental intrusion into areas of 
privacy may be measured in terms of degrees and that the 
application of the Fourth Amendment in response to such 
intrusions is not inflexible. In Cam,ara, the Court agreed 
''that a routine inspection of the physical condition of 
private property is a less hostile instrusion than the typical 
policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of 
crime".315 
'\Yhat is the. essential difference between that view and 
a recognition that detention for field interrogation pur-
poses involves ''a less hostile intrusion'' than an arrest 
which leads to custody and the preferment of charges T We 
submit there is none. 
33. Barrett, supra n. 25 at 64. 
34. 387 u. s. 523 (1967). 
35. 387 U. S. at 530. 
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The Camara opinion then goes on to say that even the 
administrative search involved there was governed by 
Fourth Amendment standards and that an individual's 
rights under such a search were not merely "peripheral" 
to the "Fourth Amendment interests at stake".36 But we 
are willing to make the very same concession here. There 
is no doubt that pre-arrest field detention for interroga-
tion is conduct which is subject to regulation under the 
Fourth Amendment and that when based on grounds 
less than reasonable suspicion of criminality is unconstitu-
tional. 
Finally, the holding in Camara-that probable cause for 
the issuance of a warrant may be found on grounds less 
than those traditionally applied in Fourth Amendment 
cases--demonstrates conclusively, we believe, , that this 
Court is willing to fashion rules which refuse to strait-
jacket Fourth Amendment responses to differing degrees 
of governmental intrusions on privacy. 
Essentially, the X AACP -derides the balancing approach 
because it believes that "reasonable suspicion" cannot be 
defined. They say: 
"But as to what citizen is it not reasonably possible 
that he has committed some crime 1 As to what un-
lmown citizen on the street (even a crowded street) 
near the scene of a known crime t As to what group of 
ill-dressed young men on a ghetto street corner? As to 
what Negro abroad on the streets in a 'white' neigh-
borhood late in the day? Surely, it is reasonably 
possible that each of these has committed a crime (or is 
about to commit one, as the New York statute and com-
mon Stop-Frisk logic provide)." 37 
The answer is, that without more, to none of them. It is 
not reasonably possible (in the sense that we, and all the 
courts which have upheld field detention, use the phrase 
36. Id. 
37. Brief for the NAACP 39-40. See also 45. 
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"reasonable suspicion") to believe that anyone in these 
categories has committed a crime and so is subject to deten-
tion. If the examples recited above contain all the informa-
tion known to the officer, he is not authorized, under the 
Fourth Amendment, to detain for interrogation. In effect, 
the am.icu.s has constructed his examples of ''reasonable 
suspicion'', and then, arguing their invalidity, has con-
cluded that our definition is unworkable and unconstitu-
tional. Since we emphatically reject his premise, we reject 
also his conclusion. 
( 4) "The courts have not in fact iniposed any limita-
tions or restrictions upon the stop and frisk power once that 
power is granted. They have not done so beca1t.se they 
co1tld not do so-because the essence of the doctrine of 
stop and frisk on less than probable cause is judicial abdica-
tion to police judgment. ' 138 
There are several answers to this argument. First, those 
courts which have upheld stol? and frisk in cases we believe 
to have been rightly decided (Terry and Dilley) have not 
demonstrated "judicial abdication to police judgement". 
Second, there exist numerous cases where state courts of 
review, in construing traditional Fourth Amendment rules, 
have, in the judgment of this Court, erred and have been 
corrected. If there are cases dealing with stop and frisk 
which ha\e been wrongly decided, explication of the proper 
principles governing the disposition of the cases now before 
the Court will serve to mark out standards in later cases. 
' It would hardly be surprising to find a few improper dis-
positions in an area of the law which, to date, contains 
no precedential opinion of this Court. 'What is surprising 
is the implicit assumption of the amicus that, thereafter, the 
state trial and appellate courts would continue to sustain 
field interrogation cases on less than reasonable grounds. 
38. Brief for the NAACP 47. 
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Nothing in the history of Fourth Amendment law warrants 
this conclusion. 
( 5) Courts cannot control the "frisk" or "search" 
power since they "can;n,ot be faulted for believing that an 
officer may always 'reasonably suspect' he is in danger. 
That is the nature of reasonable suspicion.' 139 
We can conceive of no reason why a decision whether an 
officer rightfully frisked or searched following a detention 
should be any harder to make than the decision whether an 
officer rightfully frisked or searched following an arrest. 
Since the standard is the same in both cases-a reasonable 
need to protect the life of the officer or to prevent escape-
why should there be any difficulty in applying uniform 
rules 1 Moreover, frisk or search will no more automatically 
follow detention in every case than does frisk or search 
automatically follow arrest in every case. The experience 
of prior cases demonstrates that the courts have had no 
difficulty in concluding that every police custody does not 
call for a search incident to arrest even though the arrest 
is made on probable cause. A reference to representative 
opinions in which state courts of review have refused to 
authorize blanket incidental searches, even for weapons, in 
traffic arrests will illustrate the point:'0 
AELE does not adhere to the view that since a search 
can be made only incident to an arrest on probable cause, 
only a frisk may be made incident to a detention on reason-
able suspicion. The nature of the initial interference with 
liberty is irrelevant to the kind of action which may be 
taken by the officer for his own protection. Some detentions 
may be more dangerous than arrests. Others will present 
less risk to the officer. In both arrest and detention cases, 
the proper question, in our view, is whether the action taken 
39. Brief for the NAACP 51-52. 
40. See SCHAEFER, TB.E SUSPECT AND SocIETY 42 (1967). 
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by the officer was reasonably necessary for his own protec-
tion. 41 Whether a search, frisk, or no action at all is proper 
is a question to be determined by the facts of each case. 
Under this standard the actions taken by the officers in 
Terry and Dilley, for example, were reasonable in light of 
the position in which they found themselves and should 
be upheld. 
( 6) " ... we anticipate that the States of New York and 
Ohio will make the familiar inflated claims for stop and frisk 
as tools of law and order. If they do, let there be no mistake 
about this call to practicality. Whatever its conveniences 
and benefits to a narrow view of law-enforcement, stop and 
frisk carries with it an intense danger of inciting destruc-
tive community conflict.' '42 
Essentially, what the amicus is saying is that since the 
stop and frisk practice presents a danger of police-citizen 
conflict, it ought to be outlawed because the consequent 
deterioration of police-community relations will erode 
rather than strengthen law enforcement. 
If only :field interrogation under reasonable circumstances 
is authorized by the court as constitutionally permissible, 
it makes no sense to say that the practice must be aban-
doned because it will exacerbate police-citizen relations in 
the ghetto. Under some conditions even proper use of such 
law enforcement powers like arrest, search, indictment and 
prosecution will strain relations between society and per-
sons subjected to those powers.43 
41. Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 
58 J. CRI.M. L., C. & P. S. 465, 479-84 (1967); Stern, Stop and 
Frisk: An Historical Ans-wer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. 
L., C. & P. S. 532, 538 (1967). 
42. Brief for the NAACP 68. 
43. "It is not possible for the police to enforce the law and 
preserve the peace without incurring some hostility and resent-
ment. This is inherent in the very nature of police work." P~I­
DENT's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT A.ND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, TA.SK FORCE REPORT: TBE POLICE 178. 
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Even assuming that :field interrogation procedures may 
endanger the effectiveness of law enforcement because of 
the hostility created in the ghetto, the decision whether the 
cost outweighs the gain is one for the states to make-
either by action of the legislature in restricting police 
powers or by administrative action of the police themselves. 
It is not a decision for this Court. It has nothing to do with 
the question of whether stop and frisk is constitutional.*" 
Carried to its logical end, the amicus argument would 
compel the abolition of all law enforcement techniques which 
create police-community hostility. We suppose that many 
of the ghetto residents who rebel at the notion of stop and 
frisk being practiced in their community would object to 
even the very presence of police in their community-
especially in the numbers suggested by amicus as an alter-
native to detention. 
The police could, of course, withdraw from the ghetto and 
end all police-citizen conflicts. This aiternative might be 
somewhat tolerable, if only criminals lived in the ghetto; at 
least their interferences with human liberty in the form of 
murder, robbery, rape and other crimes, would be practised 
only upon each other. But others live in the ghetto as well 
-innocent, law-abiding American citizens; by far the over-
whelming majority. They are entitled, under the same 
Constitution which the amicus says compels the rejection 
of stop and frisk, to live their lives, and experience the 
safety of their homes and their streets without fear of 
criminal marauders. They have suffered enough-discrimi-
nation, poverty, lack of education, appalling conditions of 
44. ''In order to balance the need for field interrogations and 
the harmful effect on police-community relations which may result 
from their indiscriminate use, State legislatures should define the 
extent of police authority to stop and question persons, and police 
departments should adopt detailed policies governing this authority 
whether or not legislation exists." TASK FORCE REPORT: THE 
POLICE supra note 43 at 185 (Emphasis added.) 
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housing, and community alienation. ~rust they also be 
deprived of their right to the protection of the law as well T 
Conclusion. 
Despite the evidence which has been found of cases in 
which some police have abused :field interrogation in some 
instances-evidence upon which the arnicus relies so heavily 
-the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice unanimously recommends its 
adoption and use : 
' ' The Commission believes that there is a definite 
need to authorize the police to stop suspects and pos-
sible witnesses of major crimes, to detain them for 
brief questioning if they will not voluntarily cooperate, 
and to search such suspects for dangerous weapons 
when such precaution is necessary.' '411 
Amicus Curiae requests that the judgment in Terry v. 
Ohio be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES R. TROMPSO::\, 
33 N. Dearborn Street, 
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Law Enf orce1nent. 
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